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On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Trump v. Slaughter. On its face, the case asked a simple question: Did President Trump act lawfully when, shortly after taking office in 2025, he fired the two Democratic members of the Federal Trade Commission? Much more was on the line, however, than two FTC seats. The case presented long-simmering constitutional questions about presidential power, the limits of Congress’ authority to constrain that power, and the future of so-called independent agencies.

In a 6-to-3 decision penned by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court in Trump v. Slaughter held that the president had acted lawfully — and that statutory limitations on his authority to fire the FTC commissioners were unconstitutional. This post briefly explains the Court’s decision and key takeaways from it.

Background

The FTC was created in 1914 through the passage of the FTC Act. The act provides for a bipartisan commission consisting of five commissioners who are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Under the act, commissioners are appointed to seven-year terms (spanning across presidential terms) and may be removed only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”

In March 2025, President Trump fired both of the FTC’s Democratic commissioners, leaving only two commissioners, both Republicans. In their termination letters, Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya were not told they had been removed due to inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance. They were told only that their continued service was “inconsistent with the Administration’s priorities.” Shortly thereafter, they sued in federal court, alleging that their without-cause terminations had been illegal under the plain language of the FTC Act.

The Question in Trump v. Slaughter

The lawsuit centered on the legal question of whether it was constitutional for Congress to put limitations on the president’s ability to remove FTC commissioners. That exact question had been addressed by the Court nearly 90 years earlier in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935). In Humphrey’s Executor, the Court upheld the FTC Act’s limitation on the president’s ability to remove commissioners, finding that the FTC’s duties were not “executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.” The opinion was seminal and oft cited as the constitutional foundation of so-called independent agencies in the United States.

In recent years, however, the Supreme Court in several cases questioned the reasoning of Humphrey’s Executor and repeatedly limited the scope of its holding. The question raised in Trump v. Slaughter was what remained: Was Humphrey’s Executor still good law?

The Supreme Court’s Decision

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the without-cause firings of the FTC commissioners were constitutional despite Humphrey’s Executor. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett, and in large part by Justice Clarence Thomas) held that “all that is left of Humphrey’s is its observation that an agency that ‘exercises no part of the executive power’ need not fall within the rule of Presidential removal. . . . If anything more is left of Humphrey’s, we overrule it.”

To get there, the Court first explained the history, text, and structure of relevant Constitutional provisions, concluding that they “settle[d]” the principal that “the President may remove his subordinates at will.” The Court then surveyed its own cases, first explaining that the “best word on the subject” was Myers v. United States (1926), in which the Court “reaffirmed the President’s power to fire his subordinates at will.” It was against this backdrop that the Court addressed Humphrey’s Executor.

The Court described Humphrey’s Executor as “tethered to a highly circumscribed and almost fictional view of the FTC’s role.” In the Court’s explaining, Humphrey’s Executor “applied only to agencies that occupy ‘no place in the executive department,’ are ‘independent of executive authority,’ and exercise ‘no part of the executive power.’” Since it was decided, however, the Court’s subsequent precedent found that more and more agency functions were executive powers, as opposed to “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative.” In the words of the majority, the Court had “long ago abandoned the notion that there are some powers that are only partially executive.” The Court then addressed stare decisis, the doctrine under which the Court generally adheres to its own precedent. The Court found, however, that every relevant stare decisis factor favored “letting Humphrey’s go.” 

Having analyzed the law, the Court proceeded to apply it to the controversy at hand, concluding that it was “not a close case” and that the FTC “unquestionably exercises executive power.” In particular, the Court identified that the FTC (1) has the power to promulgate substantive rules that carry the force of law, (2) enforces the law through in-house adjudications, and (3) files civil suits on behalf of the United States in federal court. All of these, the Court explained, were executive powers. And as a result, the statutory removal limitations on FTC commissioners violated the Constitution’s separation of powers.

Key Takeaways

  • Humphrey’s Executor, a bedrock case for multi-member independent agencies, has been overruled. The Court has upheld the firing of FTC commissioners without cause, leaving an agency designed to have five bipartisan commissioners with only two, both of whom are members of the president’s political party.
  • Although Trump v. Slaughter was about the FTC, the ruling will impact dozens of agencies. Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent lists agencies whose for-cause protections are now in doubt. They include the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Chemical Safety Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
  • Federal agencies will now be more directly accountable to the president. Previously, some agency heads enjoyed protection from termination, giving them some latitude in performing their duties. But now they can be removed by the president immediately upon taking office. Consequently, many agencies have lost a significant feature of what made them “independent.” And they will be more prone to change with each election cycle.
  • Although the Court’s decision appears to leave little room for upholding removal restrictions in the future, a notable exception may be the Federal Reserve. By statute, Federal Reserve governors may be removed only “for cause.” In Slaughter and a companion case decided the same day, Trump v. Cook, the Court appears to have left room to uphold this limitation. However, the Court has not definitively resolved the constitutional issue. And multiple justices have pointed out the challenge of squaring Slaughter’s categorical rule with an exception for the Federal Reserve.